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Decentralized Bribery and Market Participation∗
Sergey V. Popov
June 14, 2013
Abstract
I propose a bribery model that examines decentralized bureaucratic decisionmaking.
There are multiple stable equilibria. High levels of bribery reduce an economy’s pro-
ductivity because corruption suppresses small business, and reduces the total graft
even though individual bribe size might increase. Decentralization prevents movement
towards a Pareto-dominant equilibrium. Anti-corruption efforts, even temporary ones,
might be useful to improve participation if they lower demanded bribe levels and thus
encourage small businesses to participate.
Keywords: corruption, bribery, decentralization.
JEL: D73.
Consider a person who goes to take a driving test. A given inspector can recognize a
bad driver, and perfectly understands the welfare costs of allowing one on the road. Unlike
the obvious evil of putting unqualified drivers on the road, denying deserving drivers their
licenses does not produce welfare externalities, ignoring congestion. There are ways to deny
a qualified applicant a license safely: for instance, forgetting to check a rear-view mirror
can be inflated into “reckless driving”. Would coercing a bribe from a qualified individual
∗Popov: National Research University Higher School of Economics, Shabolovka 26, Moscow, 119049,
Russia. svp@hse.ru. I would like to thank Dan Bernhardt, Mattias Polborn, John Nye and the participants
of seminars in the Laboratory of Institutional Analysis at HSE, University of Balearic Isles, and multiple
conferences for useful suggestions and thought-provoking discussions. The support of the Basic Research
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in return for a well-deserved permit make so much a difference? I show that this “transfer
bribery”1 bears significant economic consequences. When an expected bribe is too high,
corruption hinders participation. A permit-seeker planning to drive a cab is more likely to
pay a bribe, whereas a permit-seeker planning to drive merely for pleasure is liable to refrain
from applying in the first place, if he expects coercion. A bribe that discourages participation
is likely to discourage the participation of applicants with the least bribe-paying potential.
This tendency improves a corrupt inspector’s chances of collecting bigger bribes, since the
only participants left applying will be willing to pay at the anticipated bribe level. In
response, corrupt inspectors raise their required bribes, which hinders participation even
further. In an equilibrium in which all potential applicants participate, smaller—but more
frequent—bribes from everyone constitute a Pareto-dominant outcome. However, because
decision-making is decentralized, it might be impossible to shift towards a Pareto-dominant
equilibrium.
To illustrate my point, I propose a model of bribery with the centralized government2
absent. Corruption is often systemic: in a corrupt society, it is never the case, for example,
that the police are corrupt, while educators are not. Moreover, a corrupt policeman could
eventually interact as a client with a corrupt educator, who in turn could be a client of
a corrupt doctor. And in such interactions, corrupt officials would themselves, as clients,
prefer to pay diminished bribes. But an individual change in bribe-taking behavior will not
alter the bribe amount that bribe-givers as a whole expect to give, and this critical issue
cannot be modeled assuming single centralized bureaucracy.
The literature has reached an empirical consensus that corruption is detrimental to wel-
fare, and significantly reduces both long-term growth and near-term investment. Corrupt
economies are mostly closed and heavily regulated. They spend more on capital investment
(though via less efficient projects), but less on maintenance, healthcare and education. Cor-
ruption is reinforced by deficiencies in education, low income levels, ethnic heterogeneity,
1Shleifer and Vishny (1993) calls this corruption without theft, Bliss and Di Tella (1997) calls this surplus-
shifting corruption, and Drugov (2010) calls this extortion.
2For examples of business-to-business corruption, see The Independent (1995); The Register (2012); The
St. Petersburg Times (2012).
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weak institutions, and lack of trust in the society3.
A vast segment of the literature on corruption seeks to explain the differences in corrup-
tion levels between countries. It includes a model proposed by Andvig and Moene (1990),
which suggests that corruption becomes easier for one bureaucrat if other bureaucrats be-
come corrupt as well; Alesina and Angeletos (2005) provide a model of theft from government
coffers, which argues that, because of corruption, more redistribution does not necessarily
bring more equality; Dzhumashev (2012) argues that corruption can, by jeopardizing the
stability of income, prevent access to efficient means of production, thereby discouraging
risk-averse investors; Ryvkin and Serra (2012) demonstrate that uncertainty about corrupt-
ibility discourages systemic bribery. Multiple equilibria are frequently found, explaining
striking differences in penetration of corruption across countries (see Del Monte and Pa-
pagni (2007) on differences in corruption levels among regions of Italy). Beyond stating
the difference, Mauro (2004) shows how corruption-borne differences in the efficiency of an
economy perpetuate over time, causing divergence of development trajectories.
Most of the models mentioned above are concerned with differences in rates of involve-
ment in corruption in different equilibria, whereas in my model the difference is in market
participation. The important exception is Bliss and Di Tella (1997). They argue that cor-
ruption can lower competition, move the market towards a monopoly outcome, and allow
bureaucrats to siphon away all the monopoly profits. They, too, establish that less market
participation can come part in parcel with corruption: after all, less market participation is
optimal from the bureaucrat’s point of view in their model. In my model, however, bureau-
crats would rather attract better participation, but are rendered unable by decentralization.
Svensson (2003) uses a model similar to mine to accompany a survey from Uganda to illus-
trate that the size of a bribe demand depends on a firm’s prospects. He predicts that because
of bribes, investment in a less profitable sector with more liquid assets might be preferable
to investment in a more profitable sector that features less investment reversibility precisely
because officials demand bigger bribes in the second scenario.
3See, inter alia, Mauro (1995, 1997); Tanzi and Davoodi (1997); Ades and Di Tella (1999); La Porta et al.
(1999); Djankov et al. (2002); Fan et al. (2009).
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The rent-seeking literature, pioneered by Tullock (1967) and Krueger (1974), argues that
transfers are not necessarily harmless to society since the very existence and maintenance of
these transfers is usually an outcome of the political struggle between transfer-payers and
transfer-receivers (Tullock, 1971). The wastefulness of transfer technology, resulting either
from wasteful redistribution of resources by investors or from bureaucratic misallocation, is
complementary to my argument, which does not rely on any competition, innate or induced.
This paper is organized as follows. First, I introduce the general model and define the
equilibrium. I then examine the model’s predictions: I demonstrate how to combat corrup-
tion using exit facilitation, and I illustrate that transfer bribery might keep the economy in
a bad equilibrium where small entrepreneurs do not start up their businesses. Finally, I dis-
cuss the model’s limitations and potential extensions, and conclude. The appendix contains
proofs of all Results.
1 The Model
Agents interact in a single-period game. There is a continuum of measure 1 of risk-neutral
agents, whose preferences are defined over a single good, eligible for consumption or invest-
ment. There are two types of agents: investors and inspectors, both of positive measure.
Time
Investors observe
realizations of their K
Each investor decides
whether to start up
his project
Each inspector
extorts a bribe s
R observed; investors
decide whether to bribe
inspectors or quit
Payoffs resolve
Figure 1: Timing of the game
Investors draw a project of size K, where K is the number of units required to be invested.
This can take two values, KL and KH , with probabilities λ and 1 − λ.4 A project yields a
4The heterogeneity of K could be motivated not by technology, but by the pledgeable income of investors.
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random, idiosyncratic return R ≥ 0, with a finite mean, independent of K, drawn from the
distribution with pdf fR(·) and cdf FR(·), both of which are differentiable.
After investment, each investor is assigned a random inspector, entrusted to approve the
project, but who instead attempts to extort a bribe, a sum of money s, from the project’s
profits. If the realized project’s profits after paying the bribe are too small, the project can
be cancelled, and the investor recovers a fraction φ of his investment. Each inspector gets
a finite number of projects for approval, so that each project is approved by exactly one
inspector.
Each investor must decide whether to pursue his investment project. Starting a project
of size K earns the expectation of
ER max(RK − s, φK)−K = (ER max(R− s/K, φ)− 1)K.
If the post-bribe net return is less than φ, the investor cancels the project. The investor
cannot be forced to pay a bribe, but he can choose to take everything as much as possible
and walk away.
An investor starts his project if his expected net return is positive, i.e., if
ER max(R− s/K, φ)− 1 ≥ 0. (1)
Result 1 If an investor with a project of some value of K (φ) finds it optimal to start his
project facing the bribe level of s∗, investors with projects of larger K (φ) will find it optimal
to start their projects too.
Proof. See Appendix.
An inspector observes neither K nor R, so his bribe demand cannot depend on either5.
In equilibrium, each inspector knows the sizes of the projects which are started up by in-
vestors, and on this he will form his beliefs EK [·] about the possible size of the project at
his mercy. Since inspectors are risk-neutral, the amount of projects per inspector does not
5I will relax this assumption later.
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affect the decision for each individual project. We will assume that investors are distributed
across inspectors randomly, and that the number of investors for each inspector is identically
distributed and bounded from above, to close the model. An inspector’s problem is then to
demand a bribe s that solves
max
s
sP (RK − s > φK) = max
s
sEK [(1− FR(s/K + φ))] . (2)
When the problem is well-defined, and the solution is in (0,+∞), the maximum point
will be a solution to the first-order condition:
EK [(1− FR(s∗/K + φ))] = s∗EK [1/KfR(s∗/K + φ)] ,
s∗ =
EK [(1− FR(s∗/K + φ))]
EK [1/KfR(s
∗/K + φ)]
. (3)
An equilibrium (pure strategy perfect Bayesian) is a collection of
• s∗ ∈ R+: size of the bribe, amount of money taken out of the project’s profits if the
bribe gets paid;
• K∗ ∈ R+: the critical level of investment such that investors with projects of size
K ≥ K∗ decide to pursue them;
such that
• s∗ solves the inspector’s problem (2), given rational beliefs that only projects above
K∗ are implemented (EK [·] = E[·|K ≥ K∗]), and
• an investor with a project of size K∗ is weakly better off starting the project, and all
owners of projects with K < K∗ find it suboptimal to pursue their projects, given
rational beliefs about the bribe size s∗.
This is a perfect Bayesian solution concept because the inspectors’ beliefs about the
distribution of projects’ sizes depend upon the equilibrium decisions of investors.
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Result 2 An equilibrium exists.
Proof. See Appendix.
Potential outcomes are divided into three classes depending on the investors’ participa-
tion, given that no investors are indifferent to participation and abstention6:
• full participation: both KH and KL type projects start up;
• partial participation: only KH projects start up;
• no participation: no projects are started up.7
The “full participation” and “no participation” equilibria are pooling, whereas the “par-
tial participation” equilibrium is separating.
Result 3 When a partial participation equilibrium exists, so does a full participation equi-
librium, given a big enough λ.
Proof. See Appendix.
Observe that the opposite case does not necessarily need to be true: even when all projects
are large, the hazard rate of the return distribution might force inspectors to demand bribes
small enough to allow positive profits to small projects. Result 3 also establishes some impor-
tant comparative statics: the opportunity to switch from a partial participation equilibrium
to full participation equilibrium will arise when the proportion of investors handling small
projects increases. Later I will show that this opportunity is worth pursuing.
Result 4 In a full participation equilibrium, an increase in the proportion of small project
investors λ leads to decrease in the equilibrium amount of bribe s∗ when (3) has a unique
solution.
6The equilibria where investors with K = K∗ are indifferent between participating and not, and they
therefore split nontrivially between participating and abstaining, can be shown to be unstable.
7If a partial equilibrium exists, then an argument similar to the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps
(1987) refines away the no participation equilibrium: the bribe cannot be expected to be so big that the best
possible project is not executed, because what type of projects would support these bribes?
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Proof. See Appendix.
This implies that the equilibrium bribe in full participation equilibrium is smaller than the
equilibrium bribe level in partial participation equilibrium: the bribe in partial participation
equilibrium is equal to the bribe in full participation equilibrium when the proportion of
small investors λ is zero.
How restrictive is the assumption that (3) has a unique solution? When λ = 0, (3)
diminishes to solving s/KH =
1−FR(s/KH)
fR(s/KH)
, which has a unique solution when x − 1−FR(x)
fR(x)
is increasing, known in auction literature as Myerson’s regularity condition, implied by the
assumption of nondecreasing hazard rate for the distribution of R. The same holds for the
case in which λ = 1. The hazard rate assumption does not guarantee that (3) has a unique
solution for λ ∈ (0, 1): the change in s affects the proportion of large and small projects
remaining after a bribe payment. The likelihood that remaining projects constitute large
investments increases with the size of the bribe, which can cause the right-hand side of (3)
to increase.
Next, I examine the comparative statics.
1.1 Recovery Rate Affects Bribery
The rate of recovery influences the threshold at which an investor decides that the bribe
demanded of him is too high and abandons a project. It therefore has a strong effect on
corruption. Define H(x|φ) = EK [1−FR(x/K+φ)]
EK [1/KfR(x/K+φ)]
, the right-hand side of (3). The bribe size
demanded by inspectors is indicated by the intersection of the 45◦ line with H(x|φ).
Result 5 Suppose there is no uncertainty about the project size K. In this case, an increase
in φ reduces the bribe level s = H(s|φ) as long as FR(·) has an increasing hazard rate.
Proof. See Appendix.
Many distribution families (including uniform, normal and χ2) feature an increasing
hazard rate, and the result is intuitive: a better recovery rate makes it more attractive for
an investor to cancel a project, prompting inspectors to reduce their demands. If returns
8
are exponentially distributed, with no uncertainty about investment size, the recovery rate
has no effect on the equilibrium bribe demand.
s
s,H(s|φ) 45◦ line
H(s|φ = 0)
H(s|φ = 0.2)
Bribe at φ = 0
Bribe at φ = 0.2
Note: fR(·) is 2× Beta(0.1, 0.3), KH = 1, KL = 0.5, K = KL with probability λ = 0.5.
Figure 2: Increase in recovery rate lowers the bribe.
Result 6 If EK [1/Kf
′
R(s
∗/K + φ)] is not too negative, increase in φ reduces the inspector’s
decision about the optimal bribe level.
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 2 illustrates the logic8. An increase in φ means a parallel shift of H(·|φ) to the
left. For bribe level to decrease, H(x|φ) has to decrease locally, and this determines the “not
too negative” clause.
Better recovery rates can cause reductions in bribes because a given inspector will realize
that investors have better outside opportunities, and therefore less likely to tolerate bribes.
This can motivate a bribe-taker to demand industry-specific investments from potential
investors before they can apply for a permit. This also suggests that industries with better
recovery rates should tend to suffer less from corruption, especially when one endogenizes
decisions by corrupt officials to choose the industry to target.9 This seems to be a strong
and intuitive recipe for fighting corruption: make investment more recoverable, possibly
by stimulating industries with easier recoverability. This does not mean that governments
8When intersections with the diagonal are “from above”, with s < H(s|φ) for s locally on the left from
intersection (and vice versa from the right), like on Figure 2, these are local maxima. Intersections “from
below”, when s > H(s|φ) locally on the left of intersection, are local minima.
9See Svensson (2003) for a test of the influence of opportunity costs on corruption.
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should subsidize cancellations, because then less lucrative projects may start up only to be
cancelled.
To ease presentation, φ will be set to 0 for the rest of the paper.
1.2 Decentralized Corruption Deters Entry
For this part, I will use an environment that features heterogeneity with respect to project
size and exponential returns: R ∼ Exp(α), so that P (R > t) = e−αt. As seen in Result 4
and later, in the presentation, this specific assumption about the distribution of R is readily
generalizable.
If both types of projects are started, the utility of the inspector as a function of the bribe
amount s is
sP (RK > s) = s
(
λe
−α s
KL + (1− λ)e−α sKH
)
. (4)
To solve for the equilibrium, consider the best response of inspectors. The first-order
condition of the inspector’s problem (4) is
s =
1
α
λe
−α s
KL + (1− λ)e−α sKH
λ
KL
e
−α s
KL + 1−λ
KH
e
−α s
KH
=
KL
α
1 +
(
1− KL
KH
)
e
αs
(
1
KL
− 1
KH
)
λ
1−λ +
KL
KH
e
αs
(
1
KL
− 1
KH
)
 . (5)
The right-hand side is an increasing function of s, starting from a value above KL
α
and
converging to KH
α
. Therefore, (5) has a solution.
When only projects of size KH are started, the inspector’s first-order condition’s right-
hand side changes:
s =
1
α
0× e−α sKL + 1× e−α sKH
0
KL
e
−α s
KL + 1
KH
e
−α s
KH
=
KH
α
. (6)
There might be multiple equilibria present under reasonable assumptions. Figure 3a
shows an example of such an outcome. The bribe s∗1 is a partial participation equilibrium
bribe: when inspectors demand this bribe, only projects of size KH start up. Inspectors,
expecting only projects of type KH , pick their bribe size extortion decision according to (6),
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and choose s∗1 as their bribe choice. The bribe of size s
∗
2 is the full participation equilibrium
bribe: both types of projects find it optimal to start up, since even smallest projects will start
up (s∗2 < sˆ). Inspectors, expecting both types of projects to start up, choose the extorted
bribe size using Equation (5), and choose s2.
s
s,H(s)
45◦ line
sˆ
Equation (6)KH
α
Equation (5)
s∗2
KL
α
s∗1
Full
participation
bribe
Partial participation bribe
Unstable equilibrium
(a) Non-informed inspectors
s
s,H(s)
45◦ line
KL
α
KH
α
Equation (6)
(5) with λL
(5) with λH
s∗L s
∗
H
Full
participation
bribes
Partial participation bribe
(b) Informed inspectors
Note: α = 0.2, KL = 1, KH = 2, λ = 0.6. sˆ is the bribe that agents with type L projects can pay and be indifferent between starting
up the project or not; Equation (1) holds with equality for K = KL and s = sˆ. Both partial and full paricipation equilibria exist. For
Figure 3a, the solid line connects the relevant parts of Equations (5) and (6) to reveal the best response of the investors. For Figure
3b, the expected return of the low-type project allows for the existence of full participation equilibrium. λH and λL are defined below,
in Equation (7).
Figure 3: Multiple equilibria
Both equilibria are stable: a tiny perturbation in the fundamentals of both investors’
and inspectors’ problems does not make either equilibrium go away. The full participation
equilibrium needs either a large enough λ or E[R] to exist. Lower KH
KL
also lowers the bribe
size without affecting the participation constraint for KL types.
The welfare costs of bribery are found not so much in the loss of less lucrative projects
(those that get cancelled), but rather in the squandering of small projects in the partial
participation equilibrium. Even though a temporary effort in lowering bribes cannot remove
bribes completely, it can be strong enough to move the economy into an equilibrium where
more projects are started up. Both inspectors and investors of all types are better off in a
full participation equilibrium:
• large project investors pay smaller bribes (Result 4), and therefore both collect higher
profits in each project, and liquidate fewer projects;
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• small project investors now collect a positive net expected profit (since their partici-
pation constraint is satisfied), and are therefore better off;
• inspectors’ total graft is larger: the total bribe collection in a full participation equilib-
rium is larger than it would be were the bribe amount set at the partial participation
equilibrium level; that amount of total collection is larger than the total bribe amount
in the partial equilibrium because of stronger participation.
• since all inspectors are identical, the expected graft per inspector is larger.
Were inspectors able to communicate and make centralized decisions, they could facilitate
movement into a better equilibrium, for instance by announcing that they are going to levy
smaller bribes. If inspectors could coordinate on such centralized deviation, they would do
so.
If inspectors had perfect information about every project’s size, this shortcoming would
not be an issue, as inspectors could charge bribes proportional to the size of each project.
Even imperfect information would ease the participation constraint on the small projects’
investors, potentially inviting them to participate. This would not, however, destroy the
partial participation equilibrium.
Assume that an inspector obtains a correct signal about the size of the project with
probability q > 1
2
. The inspector would update his belief in the probability of observing a
low-type project:
λH =
(1− q)λ
q(1− λ) + (1− q)λ, λL =
qλ
qλ+ (1− q)(1− λ) . (7)
Since q > 1/2, then λL < λ < λH , where λi is the probability of observing a low-size project
conditional on size i ∈ {L,H}. For every signal, each inspector will solve a bribe demand
problem similar to (3). These problems are illustrated on Figure 3b: s∗i is the bribe demand
by the inspector who observes signal i.
Result 7 If a partial participation equilibrium exists, then given a large enough q, so will a
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full participation equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
This does not preclude the existence of a partial participation equilibrium. Even if
q is big enough, to cause a full participation equilibrium to exist, the anticipation that
small businesses will not start up will lead inspectors to rationally disregard signals about
the projects’ size. Investors with small projects will stay away, reaffirming the beliefs of
inspectors. Even if investors could cooperate and start up a positive mass of small projects
to manifest their collective potential, the decentralization of decisionmaking would allow
individual inspectors neither to comprehend the organized deviation nor to attempt lowering
the bribe to attract small businesses. Unless q = 1, the problem of squandering small projects
persists.
2 Discussion and Extensions
Competition among investors is assumed away to illustrate that the multiplicity of equilibria
is not driven by strategic complementarities or rent-seeking. One could assume that the
return distribution is stochastically improving if there are fewer projects starting up. This
could yield two equilibria, one with high profits and high bribes, and another with low profits
and low bribes, depending upon the functional form of stochastic improvement. On the other
hand, more competition induces more innovation, and hence in the long run the total graft
might be higher in a more competitive allocation.
Risk aversion is not modeled explicitly, but the results are robust. Risk-averse investors’
participation constraints will be harder to satisfy, but this will not change investor behavior
after investment, since I assume no uncertainty about R at the point of decision to pay the
bribe. Hence, the bribe amount will not be affected unless the set of participating projects is
affected. Inspectors risk aversion, on the other hand, will somewhat change the inspector’s
problem. Particularly, if the Bernoulli utility of s dollars of bribe is u(s) = (s + µ)ρ − µρ,
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where ρ ∈ (0, 1) and µ > 0, the inspector’s choice equation (3) becomes
s = ρ
EK [1− FR(s/K)]
EK [1/KfR(s/K)]
+
increases in s︷ ︸︸ ︷
µ
((
1 +
s
µ
)1−ρ
− 1
)
.
When µ is zero, only the first term remains. The second part of the right-hand side increases
more slowly than the left-hand side given a big enough s, so the optimal solution exists
if the solution existed originally. The solution is continuous in µ and ρ. If, in addition,
u′(0) = ρµρ−1 ≤ 1, this can be interpreted as a wasteful bribe-pocketing technology, where
the transfer of s produces (s+ µ)ρ − µρ ≤ s of cash in the inspector’s pocket.
Honest inspectors who do not ask for bribes will relax the participation constraint, cre-
ating a more hospitable atmosphere for small businesses, but at the same time, they will let
the big fish go away un-squeezed. The body of corrupt officials might actually be interested
in cleansing the ranks in order to induce more participation from investors, depending upon
the shapes of distributions of R and K, but not necessarily to the socially optimal levels.
A general equilibrium model would provide a richer view of ways in which corruption
hurts society. It could feature the choice of role, decisions of a policymaker regarding the
inspectors’ remuneration package, taxation and supervision over the inspectors, the decision
of each investor to run a “good” or “bad” project (with unfavorable properties like negative
externalities; in the current model, inspectors cannot all be dismissed because they are
implicitly assumed to deter all “bad” projects), and the decision of an inspector to prevent
a “bad” project or let it be carried out for a bribe. One can contemplate the wage effects:
higher wages in alternative employment can lower the average bribe amount demanded,
because the projects would become relatively less profitable. But at the same time, higher
wages can increase the average collected graft amount too, since some of the inspectors would
prefer alternative employment. One can also see that the squandering of small projects would
lead to lower demand for labor, and therefore lower wages, having an indirect effect on ex-
post inequality. However, all this will obscure the main interaction I want to elucidate: the
relationship between “good” project starters and corrupt inspectors.
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3 Conclusion
In this study, I find that transfer bribery is not economically neutral. Too high a bribe
might not only kill the less lucrative projects, but also discourage small businesses from
opening up, since bureaucrats cannot distinguish an investment size from the investment’s
return. Joint deviation into a better equilibrium where small projects start up is not feasible
due to decentralization. A large enough crackdown on corruption, even temporary, can
induce better participation by lowering the bribes temporarily, which will change the beliefs
of inspectors and lower the bribes in the long run. Granted, such a crackdown increases
both the sum of bribes collected and the number of those who pay bribes, both of which
are common measures of corruption levels in the empirical literature, but all agents will be
better off.
A Proofs of Results
Result 1: Fix the level of bribe s. Let K ′ > K, and let ER max(R − sK , φ) ≥ 1 hold
for K. Observe that s
K′ <
s
K
, and therefore R − s
K′ > R − sK for every R. Therefore,
max(
(
R− s
K′
)
, φ) ≥ max((R− s
K
)
, φ). Take expectations to obtain the result.
Let φ′ > φ. Observe that max(
(
R− s
K
)
, φ) ≤ max(max((R− s
K
)
, φ), φ′) = max(
(
R− s
K
)
, φ′)
for every R. Take expectations to obtain the result.
Result 2: An equilibrium with no participation always exists. Whether either full or
partial participation equilibria exist can be ascertained by solving (3) and verifying the
participation constraints.
Result 3: In a partial participation equilibrium, the bribe level s∗1 solves s
∗
1/KH =
1−FR(s∗1/KH+φ)
fR(s
∗
1/KH+φ)
. Since we assumed that a partial participation equilibrium exists, this satisfies
the participation constraint for investors with large projects: ER max(R − s∗1/KH , φ) > 1.
The equation that sets the bribe level s∗2 when both types of projects participate at λ = 1 is
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determined from
s∗2 =
λ(1− FR(s∗2/KL + φ)) + (1− λ)(1− FR(s∗2/KH + φ))
λfR(s∗2/KL)/KL + (1− λ)fR(s∗2/KH)/KH
∣∣∣∣
λ=1
=
1− FR(s∗2/KL + φ)
fR(s∗2/KL + φ)/KL
,
which produces s∗2/KL = s
∗
1/KH . SinceER [max(R− s∗2/KL, φ)] = ER [max(R− s∗1/KH , φ)] >
1, there is a full participation equilibrium at λ = 1. By continuity of s2 with respect to λ,
for λ close to 1, the participation constraint will still hold.
Result 4: For the purpose of clarity, φ = 0; nothing changes if φ is positive. Let s∗(λ)
denote the bribe demanded in the full participation equilibrium when the proportion of small
projects is equal to λ.
If only KL (KH) types of projects were present in the economy, which corresponds to
λ = 1 (λ = 0), the bribe levels are
s∗(1)/KL =
1− FR(s∗(1)/KL)
fR(s∗(1)/KL)
, s∗(0)/KH =
1− FR(s∗(0)/KH)
fR(s∗(0)/KH)
.
Therefore, s∗(1)/KL = s∗(0)/KH , which, particularly, means that s∗(0) > s∗(1). Also, the
uniqueness of solution to (3) guarantees that
s/KL <
1− FR(s/KL)
fR(s/KL)
when s < s∗(1),
and the opposite is true if s > s∗(1), because there is exactly one point where equality
holds10. Similar statements hold for s∗(0). Therefore,
sfR(s/KL)/KL > 1− FR(s/KL), s > s∗(1),
sfR(s/KH)/KH > 1− FR(s/KH), s > s∗(0).
Opposite statements hold for cases when s < s∗(1) and s < s∗(0). Now let us return back
10If the inequality sign does not change at s = s∗(0), the solution of the first-order condition is not
a maximum, but rather an inflection point, assumed away when I was discussing the statement of the
inspector’s problem.
16
to the full participation equilibrium. For every λ ∈ (0, 1), no bribe level above s∗(0) can be
a solution of the inspector’s problem:
s
 EK [fR(s/K)/K]︷ ︸︸ ︷λfR(s/KL)/KL + (1− λ)fR(s/KH)/KH
 > EK [1−FR(s/K)]︷ ︸︸ ︷λ (1− FR(s/KL)) + (1− λ) (1− FR(s/KH))
⇒ s > EK [1− FR(s/K)]
EK [fR(s/K)]
when s ≥ max(s∗(1), s∗(0)) = s∗(0).
Therefore, the equilibrium bribe level is less than s∗(0). Equivalently, one can show that no
bribe level below s∗(1) can be a solution in the full participation model. Unless λ is equal
to 0 or 1, equilibrium bribe level has to belong to (s∗(1), s∗(0)).
Now fix λ′ ∈ (λ, 1]. From s∗(λ) being a unique solution of (3), we get
s
EK [fR(s/K)/K|λ]︷ ︸︸ ︷
[λfR(s/KL)/KL + (1− λ)fR(s/KH)/KH ] >
> λ (1− FR(s/KL)) + (1− λ) (1− FR(s/KH))︸ ︷︷ ︸
EK [1−FR(s/K)|λ]
, s > s∗(λ), (8)
sfR(s/KL)/KL > 1− FR(s/KL), s > s∗(1). (9)
Here EK [·|λ] is the expectation with respect to K of the argument when the proportion of
small projects is λ. Sum inequalities (8) and (9) weighed by 1−λ
′
1−λ and
λ′−λ
1−λ correspondingly
to obtain
s
EK [fR(s/K)/K|λ′]︷ ︸︸ ︷
[λ′fR(s/KL)/KL + (1− λ′)fR(s/KH)/KH ] >
EK [1−FR(s/K)|λ′]︷ ︸︸ ︷
λ′ (1− FR(s/KL)) + (1− λ′) (1− FR(s/KH)),
s ≥ max(s∗(λ), s∗(1)) = s∗(λ).
Rewriting as s > EK [1−FR(s/K)|λ
′]
EK [fR(s/K)/K|λ′] when s ≥ max(s∗(λ), s∗(1)) = s∗(λ), one can see that s∗(λ′)
cannot be above s∗(λ).
Result 5: When there is no uncertainty, HR(s|φ) = 1−FR(s+φ)fR(s+φ) . When R distribution
features an increasing hazard rate, HR(·) is decreasing. An increase in φ means a shift of
HR(·) to the left; hence, the intersection is happening at a smaller value of s.
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Result 6: H(x|φ) is decreasing in x when
∂H(x|φ)
∂φ
=
(
− EK [fR(
x/K + φ)]
EK [1/KfR(x/K + φ)]
−H(x|φ)E[
1/Kf ′R(x/K + φ)]
E[1/KfR(x/K + φ)]
)
< 0. (10)
This has to hold at x = s∗, which makes “not too negative” to be
E[1/Kf ′R(s
∗/K + φ)] > −EK [fR(
s∗/K + φ)]
H(s∗|φ) .
The sufficient condition for Result 6 to hold would be to have f ′(s∗/K) > 0 at K = KL and
KH .
Result 7: When the partial participation equilibrium exists, it means that for H-type
projects, s∗H =
1−FR(s∗H/KH)
fR(s
∗
H/KH)
KH satisfies the participation constraint, or that ER max(R −
s∗H/KH, 0) > 1. When q = 1, s∗L =
1−FR(s∗L/KL)
fR(s
∗
L/KL)
KL, and therefore s
∗
H/KH = s
∗
L/KL, since the
solution to t = 1−FR(t)
fR(t)
is unique by assumption. Because of this, max(R− s∗L/KL, 0) > 1, and
therefore participation constraint is satisfied. Finally, one can see that s∗L(q) is continuous
in q around q = 1. Therefore, there exists a q big enough to support the existence of a full
participation equilibrium.
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